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This article presents the design and implementation of a trusted sensor node that provides
Internet-grade security at low system cost. We describe trustedFleck, which uses a commodity
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) chip to extend the capabilities of a standard wireless sensor
node to provide security services such as message integrity, confidentiality, authenticity, and sys-
tem integrity based on RSA public-key and XTEA-based symmetric-key cryptography. In addition
trustedFleck provides secure storage of private keys and provides platform configuration registers
(PCRs) to store system configurations and detect code tampering. We analyze system performance
using metrics that are important for WSN applications such as computation time, memory size,
energy consumption and cost. Our results show that trustedFleck significantly outperforms previ-
ous approaches (e.g., TinyECC) in terms of these metrics while providing stronger security levels.
Finally, we describe a number of examples, built on trustedFleck, of symmetric key management,
secure RPC, secure software update, and remote attestation.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor network (WSN) applications [Dinh et al. 2007; Hu et al. 2005;
Mainwaring et al. 2002; Szewczyk et al. 2004; Wark et al. 2007] are growing,
yet security and privacy remain largely ignored in reported deployments. Algo-
rithms such as those for over-the-air programming, while useful to researchers
and network operators, generally leave the door “wide open” for injection of ma-
licious code. While the importance of security and privacy is generally agreed
upon, the problem seems to be considered impractical to solve given the limited
computational and energy resources available at the node level. For commer-
cial deployment, privacy, authenticity, and confidentiality will be required for
applications such as monitoring resource utilization (for billing purposes of
water or power), as well as for the remote management of WSN and upgrading
of software (such as over-the-air reprogramming of application images). The
hard-learned lesson from the PC industry is that ignoring security at the out-
set leads to huge pain when the technology becomes ubiquitous. In this article
we present trustedFleck (see Figure 1), which increases very strong (internet-
grade) security services through the use of a low-cost commodity coprocessor
that is practical to add (in terms of physical size, memory usage, and energy
consumption) to a sensor node.
Symmetric (shared) key algorithms are tractable on mote-class hardware
and can achieve message confidentiality. However, key distribution and man-
agement remain significant practical challenges, and these algorithms poorly
support message authenticity and integrity. On the Internet, public key cryp-
tography (PKC) is widely used to support symmetric session key management,
as well as message authenticity and integrity. Researchers have investigated
methods to support PKC technology in WSN [Watro et al. 2004; Liu and Ning
2008]. Such approaches have focused on software-based PKC technologies, such
as Rivest-Shamir-Adelman (RSA) and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) but
the performance has been poor given the low clock rate and memory availabil-
ity. Consequently, a smaller RSA public exponent (e) and a shorter key size are
chosen, which seriously compromises the security level of PKC encryption.
Multihop over-the-air programming (MOAP) protocols such as Deluge [Hui
and Culler 2004] enable application users to program and reprogram WSNs
easily, but it also opens the door for unauthorized users to implant malicious
code into the WSN. Current approaches [Dutta et al. 2006] focus on how to
enforce program authenticity and integrity by introducing software-based RSA
PKC, but again with a small RSA public exponent (e) and a short key size—
resulting in some, but weak, security.
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Fig. 1. Prototype trustedFleck TPM module (upper side) implemented as an expansion board
for the Fleck WSN node. The board is 50 × 50m but the main component, the TPM chip, is just
6.1 × 9.7mm.
Recently, Francillon and Castelluccia [2008] showed that, when the boot-
loader (MOAP) is enabled, it is possible to exploit the buffer overflow vulner-
abilities in TinyOS [Levis et al. 2005], and it is possible to permanently inject
malicious code over the air into the Harvard architecture MicaZmote1 program
flash. The attacker can then gain control of a large number of nodes and create
botnets, which are collections of compromised nodes running software under a
common command and control infrastructure. Further, Goodspeed [2007] has
demonstrated how to inject malicious code byte-by-byte and execute the code
in a Von Neumann architecture (MSP 430) Telosb mote.
As WSNs transition from research tools to production, it is important for the
WSN owner to have the capabilities of controling application image reprogram-
ming and verifying the code running in sensor nodes. trustedFleck provides a
set of trust primitives based on platform configuration register (PCR) opera-
tions on the Trusted PlatformModule (TPM), which enables remote attestation
in sensor networks. A sink can thus challenge the system configuration of a re-
mote node and find out whether the node has been compromised. The sink can
then seek remedies (e.g., reprogram the node) if the node fails the challenge.
In this article, we introduce the design and implementation of trustedFleck, a
sensor platform that uses trusted platformmodule (TPM) hardware to augment
the node. Our extensive evaluation shows that trustedFleck provides Internet-
level PKC and remote attestation services with reasonable energy consumption
and financial overhead. The contributions of this article include the following:
1MicaZ motes and Flecks, the sensor nodes used in this article, have similar microcontrollers
(Atmega 128; see Section 4.1).
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—The design and implementation of the trustedFleck platform, which includes
a standard TPM chip and a set of software primitives, to support public key
cryptography (PKC), and remote attestations in a WSN. To the best of our
knowledge, trustedFleck is the first platform that supports most RSA-based
PKC (encryption, decryption, signature, and signature verification) and
remote attestation (PCR extend, PCR read, PCR quote, PCR verifyQuote)
primitives in a WSN. RSA-based PKC provides e-commerce-level security on
the Internet, and trustedFleck brings this level of security to WSNs.
—Extensive evaluation of the trustedFleck platform in terms of computation
time, energy consumption, memory footprint and cost. The results demon-
strate the feasibility of the trustedFleck platform, and show that trusted-
Fleck significantly outperforms previous approaches, such as TinyECC, in
terms of computational time and memory usage, while providing stronger
security levels.
—A demonstration that the trustedFleck platform is easy to use through im-
plementation case studies for remote attestation, key management, secure
software update, and secure remote procedure calls (RPC) services.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. We present related work in
Section 2. In Section 3, we give a brief overview of the RSA algorithm and the
concept of trusted computing, which trustedFleck is based on, followed by a
detailed description of the software and hardware architecture of trustedFleck
(Section 4). We evaluate the performance of trustedFleck in terms of compu-
tational time, energy consumptional and financial cost in Section 5. Section 6
describes, by means of a case study, how the trustedFleck primitives can be
used to implement state-of-the-art remote attestation, key management, se-
cure RPC, and a secure software update protocol, and improve the protocol’s
performance. Finally, we conclude the article in Section 7.
2. RELATED WORK
In this section, we provide a brief overview of secure communications most
directly relevant to trustedFleck.
RSA is the most widely used PKC on the Internet, and a comprehensive
guide to RSA is available in Rivest et al. [1978]. RSA is much slower than the
eXtended Tiny Encryption Algorithm (XTEA) [Needham and Wheeler 1997]
and other (shared) symmetric cryptography such as TinySec [Karlof et al. 2004].
It is our thesis that most of the secure communications in resource-
constrained WSNs will be based on symmetric cryptography. However, due
to the vulnerability of nodes, an effective symmetric key establishment and
management scheme is of prime importance. RSA and Diffie Hellman key
agreement techniques [Goldwasser 1997] are widely used key agreement pro-
tocols on the Internet, but have been previously considered infeasible for WSNs
because of the resource constraints of sensor devices.
Researchers have proposed a limited version of RSA PKC (TinyPK) that
performs encryption operations only and uses smaller RSA parameters such
as public exponents and key sizes [Watro et al. 2004]. However, the security
ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks, Vol. 7, No. 1, Article 5, Publication date: August 2010.
Toward Trusted Wireless Sensor Networks • 5:5
levels of RSA cryptography are severely compromised by using smaller public
exponents and key sizes. Recently, the importance of symmetric key cryptog-
raphy and the critical roles of the key management mechanism in WSNs was
observed by Nilsson et al. [2008], who proposed an efficient symmetric key
management protocol for WSNs. However, they focused on the protocol design
and formal verification, and did not address the resource constraints in im-
plementing the protocol. MiniSec provides confidentiality and authenticity for
both unicast and broadcast messages by applying a nonce (a combination of
packet number and time information) to the message payload before encrypt-
ing them by the Offset Code Book (OCB)[Luk et al. 2007]. However, MiniSec
assumes that a share key is kept safe at all nodes. Therefore, MiniSec still
needs an effective key establishment and management scheme.
The research community is developing faster and more energy efficient
PKC algorithms such as Tiny Elliptic Curve Cryptography TinyECC [Liu and
Ning 2008] for resource-impoverished WSNs. While TinyECC shows the most
promise to run at usable speeds on WSN nodes [Gurn et al. 2004], there are
concerns related to patents, which are one of the main factors limiting the wide
acceptance of ECC. In this regard, we note that the RSA and XTEA algorithms
used in this work are both in the public domain. Further, there is no remote
attestation support in TinyECC.
Whilemultihop over-the-air programming (MOAP) protocols [Hui andCuller
2004] enable application users to program and reprogram WSNs easily, it also
opens the door for unauthorized users to implant malicious code into WSNs.
Dutta et al. [2006] attempted to secure the MOAP by introducing program
authenticity and integrity with software-based RSA PKC similar to TinyPK
[Watro et al. 2004]. As in TinyPK, the security levels of RSA cryptography will
be compromised by using smaller RSA public exponents and key sizes.
Believing that PKC such as RSA and ECC is too resource-intensive for
resource-impoverishedWSNs, researchers have investigated alternative meth-
ods to ensure program authenticity and integrity by secure hash chains, hash
trees, and/or their hybrids [Deng et al. 2006; Tan et al. 2008].
In contrast to the existing alternatives to PKC that typically have limited
functions, trustedFleck provides e-commerce-level PKC, which facilitates se-
cure communication services such as confidentiality, authenticity, and integrity
with lowfinancial overhead, by exploiting the capability of a commodity Trusted
Platform Module (TPM) chip.
In the development of remote attestation for WSNs, software-based attesta-
tion mechanisms have gained a lot of attentions in the past few years. Shaneck
et al. [2005] argued for obfuscating the attestation routine to maximize the
difficulties of attackers against remote attestation protocols [Shaneck et al.
2005]. SWATT [Seshadri et al. 2004] performs the attestation on embedded
devices with a completely software-based approach for memory verification.
SAKE [Seshadri et al. 2008] employs random memory check based upon ICE
(Indisputable Code Execution) [Seshadri et al. 2006]. Most of these existing
software-based attestation mechanisms focus on providing a trustworthy rou-
tine to guarantee the trustworthiness of the attestation process. It is com-
monly agreed that software-based solutions are more vulnerable to attacks
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than hardware-based solutions. Hence, equipped with TPM on fleck, remote
attestation could be more robust against attacks.
3. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO THE RSA ALGORITHM AND TPM
In this section, we provide an overview of the RSA algorithm [Rivest et al.
1978] and the TPM, a motivator for our trustedFleck.
3.1 Rivest-Shamir-Adelman (RSA) Algorithm
RSA is an algorithm for Public KeyCryptography (PKC), also called asymmetric
cryptography, in which the encryption key is different from the decryption key.
RSA is the first proposed algorithm suitable for signing and encryption, and
is used widely in secure communication protocols, such as Secure Shell (SSH)
and Secure Sockets Layer (SSL),2 on the Internet.
In addition to the RSA algorithm itself, we will also discuss some RSA terms
and parameters, such as modulus (n), random numbers (p and q), public ex-
ponents (e), and key sizes (k), and their implications for the RSA algorithm
computation complexity and security levels.
The RSA algorithm generates a public key and a private key pair simulta-
neously as follows. First, RSA chooses two large random prime numbers p and
q. Second, RSA calculates the product (n) of p and q: n = pq, where n is used
as the modulus for RSA public and private keys. Third, RSA calculates the
Euler’s totient function of n, given by ϕ(n) = (p−1)(q−1). Fourth, RSA chooses
an integer (e, also called the public exponent) such that 1 < e < ϕ(n), and
gcd(e, ϕ(n)) = 1, where gcd stands for the greatest common divisor (GCD). The
public exponent (e) and the modulus (n) together comprise the public key. Fifth,
RSA calculates the private exponent (d) by de ≡ mod ϕ(n), where parameters
d, p, q are kept secrets.
Since the public key (n, e) of Alice is available to everyone, Bob can then
encrypt a plain text message (m) by
c = me mod n, (1)
where c is the cipher text (cipher) of plain text message m, and 0 ≤ c < n. Only
Alice, the owner of kept secrets (d, p, q), can decrypt the cipher (c) and obtain
plain text message (m) by
m= cd mod n. (2)
Further, with her private key (d, p, q), Alice can use the RSA algorithm to
sign a message by generating a signature (s) by substituting c with a hash
value H(m) of m in Equation (2), for example, s = Hd(m) mod n. After receiving
(m, s), Bob uses the same hash function (H), together with Alice’s public key
(n, e), to verify the signature by Equation (1).
Because the sizes of p and q are approximately half the key size (k), the
security level of RSA cryptography is a function of e and k. A popular choice
(such as in OpenSSL3) for the public exponent is e = 216 + 1 = 65,537. Using
2http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246.
3http://www.openssl.org/.
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small e values such as 3, 5, or 17 can dramatically reduce computational cost,
but lead to greater security risks [Rivest et al. 1978; Hastad 1986]. The default
e value in trustedFleck is 65,537. It is commonly believed that a RSA key size of
512 bits is too small to use nowadays. Bernstein [2001] has proposed techniques
that simplify brute force attack RSA, and other work based on Bernstein [2001]
has suggested that 1024-bit RSA keys can be broken in 1 year by a device that
costs $10 million rather than trillions as in previous predictions [Shamir and
Tromer 2003]. Using an RSA key of least 2048-bit length is for recommended
deployments beyond 2010.4 Therefore, the default RSA key size in trustedFleck
is set to 2048 bits.
3.2 Trusted Platform Module (TPM)
The TPM is a dedicated security chip following the Trust Computing standard
specification [TCG 2007].The objective of a TPM is to provide a hardware-based
root of trust for a computing system. According to the standard specification in
TCG [2007], the following two key components are included in the TPM design
that are most relevant to WSNs:
—Cryptography operation engine. In TPM, a range of the cryptographic op-
erations are available, including RSA engine for signature generation and
message decryption, Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) Engine, and Random
Number Generation (RNG). The security design inWSNwith TPM improves
over the software-based security design in the following two ways. First, ev-
ery TPM is programmed with a unique RSA key pair and the private part
never leaves the nonvolatile storage area (i.e., protected memory) of TPM.
Even in the event of sensor nodes being captured by an adversary, the pri-
vate part of the RSA key would not be available to the adversary for further
attacks. Second, the cryptographic operation engine in TPM is much more
efficient than the software-based one [Watro et al. 2004; Liu and Ning 2008]
in terms of execution time and power consumption, which is further explored
in this article in the context of WSNs.
—Platform Configuration Register (PCR). TPM contains a number (usually 16)
of platform configuration registers (PCRs). The content stored in each PCR
is a digest of messages in regard to the platform environment (or some other
integrity-sensitive messages). PCRs are located in the nonvolatile storage
area (shielded internal memory slots) and hence cannot be directly tampered
with.
4. THE TRUSTEDFLECK ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we discuss both hardware and softwaremodules of trustedFleck.
4.1 Hardware Module
Fleck [Sikka et al. 2004] (see Figure 2) is built around the Harvard architec-
ture Atmel Atmega 1281 micro-controller, with 8 kBytes of RAM and an 8-MHz
4http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2004.
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Fig. 2. The Fleck node that features the Harvard architecture Atmega 1281 micro-controller and
I2C bus for embedded devices (both highlighted).
central processing unit(CPU). Unlike the more common Von Neumann archi-
tecture, Harvard architecture micro-controllers separate data address space
from program address space. This separation makes it harder for malicious
users to exploit software vulnerabilities such as stack overflows.
Fleck3 uses the packet-based Nordic NRF905 transceiver for communica-
tion, which has a transmission range of up to 1,000 m in outdoor environments.
The Fleck also features 1 MByte of flash storage and a real-time clock.
The Fleck hardware architecture relies heavily on the SPI bus. Atmega
1281 acts as the SPI master and can communicate with the radio, the flash
memory, the real-time clock, and the temperature sensor over the SPI inter-
face. The real-time clock and the radio can both interrupt Atmega1281 to sig-
nal alarms, packet transmission, and packet reception. To facilitate embedded
sensor device connections, Fleck3 also features an I2C interface (highlighted in
Figure 2).
The core of trustedFleck is an Atmel AT97SC3203S TPM chip (see Figure 1)
mounted on a Fleck expansion board (see Figure 3). The TPM chip follows ver-
sion 1.2 of the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) specification for TPM.5 It has
5http://www.atmel.com/dyn/resources/prod_documents/5132s.pdf.
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Fig. 3. The trustedFleck (Fleck3 and TPM module).
Fig. 4. The trustedFleck TPM module block diagram.
a true random number generator (RNG), which is Federal Information Pro-
cessing Standards (FIPS) 140-2 compliant. By implementing computationally
intensive RSA operations in hardware, the TPM chip performs these operations
in an efficient manner. For example, it can compute a 2048-bit RSA signature
in 500 ms according to the Atmel data sheet.5 The TPM module has a 100-kHz
SMBus which is electrically equivalent to the I2C, enabling the TPM to be con-
nected to the Fleck’s I2C interface. We believe that it should not be difficult to
interface the TPM component to other microcontrollers such as the MSP 430,
which also has an I2C interface.
Figure 4 shows a block diagram of the TPMmodule, which includes the bare
minimum of components required for its operation: the TPM chip, a crystal,
oscillator, a voltage regulator, a power switch, and an expansion connector.
4.2 Software Module
The fleck operating system (FOS) is similar in spirit to MANTIS OS developed
at the Department of Computer Science, University of Colorado at Boulder
[Bhatti et al. 2005]. FOSprovides a priority-based, nonpreemptive (cooperative)
threading environment with separate fixed-size stacks for each thread, and a
separate interrupt stack. The kernel checks all stacks at system entry and
invokes a panic if a stack overflow has occurred. FOS has the advantage of
providing a simple concurrent programming model which does not require
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semaphores. The scheduler is also responsible for CPU power management
and enters the lowest mode consistent with thread resource requirements.
Time-critical operations such as analog data sampling or high-speed timers
are handled by interrupt-level callbacks. A virtualized timer based on an event-
time queue is provided for non-time-critical delays. FOS currently provides a
classic carrier sense multiple access (CSMA) media access control (MAC) with
optional acknowledgment and low-power duty-cycling support.
FOS provides uniform access to underlying resources via a POSIX-like API
for configuring the hardware and sending/receiving data using the hardware,
including the SPI-bus, serial ports, nonvolatile storage, etc. Support is also
provided for a large collection of interface boards including GPS and inertial
measurement sensors used in the mobile animal nodes. The I/O model is for
blocking read and write primitives, with Unix-like semantics, and optional
timeout on read.
FOS has been ported to our range of Flecks, all of which use the Atmega
128 and 1281 processors and different radios from the Nordic nRF90x series
and solar power. Hardware abstraction is always a difficult balance between
generality and efficiency, and our philosophy has been a middle ground where
the programmer is expected to be aware of the device limitations. With timers,
for example, a consistent and powerful interface to timers is presented; however
the number of timers, their individual characteristics, and their effect on power
management are issues the programmer must deal with.
Other support tools include a static analyzer for stack sizing, a memory
dump analyzer, an RPC mechanism with support for host programs written in
Python, and a bootloader for reliable over-the-air programming.
4.3 trustedFleck Primitives
For the convenience of WSN application developers, we have implemented a
set of TPM primitives as an FOS library module. We divide these primitives
into three categories: general TPM functions, symmetric and asymmetric key
cryptography functions, and trust functions.
4.3.1 General TPM Functions. This Application Programming Inter-
face (API) is summarized in Figure 5. Previous research [Hill and Culler
2002] has shown that the primitives, which allow an application to turn
a system component on or off, are important to conserve system en-
ergy consumption in sensor networks. trustedFleck allows applications to
duty cycle the TPM component using the primitives fos tpm startup() and
fos tpm turnoff(). fos tpm startup() takes a startup mode parameter that
is one of TPM ST CLEAR (clean start), TPM ST SAVE (restores saved con-
figurations such as PCR values), or TPM ST DEACTIVE. These duty cycle
primitives are very important in trustedFleck because the TPM’s current con-
sumption (around 50 mA) is significantly greater than Flecks’ average current
consumption (around 5 mA).
Symmetric keys are typically generated by a pseudorandom number gen-
erator, for example, see Karlof et al. [2004]. If an attacker can extract the
initial random symmetric key, then it is possible for the attacker to compute
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Fig. 5. The trustedFleck Application Programming Interface (API) for general TPM functions.
all past and future random symmetric keys. Therefore, a high-quality random
number generator is very important for the effectiveness of symmetric key op-
erations. trustedFleck provides the fos tpm rand() primitive, which is based on
a true random number generator (RNG), and is Federal Information Processing
Standards (FIPS) 140-2 compliant. The fos tpm rand() primitive returns an
unsigned integer value between 0 and 232 − 1 = 4,294,967,295.
A Hash Algorithm (SHA-1) is one of the most frequently used cryptographic
operations for TPM commands as it produces a collision-free 20-byte hashed
digest regardless of the length of the input messages. trustedFleck provides
the fos tpm SHA1() primitive to compute the digest of message strings. Given
its characteristics, the input message of some TPM commands would be first
“hashed” via SHA-1, whose hashed digest could be the actual input for the
respective TPM commands. For example, in fos tpm sign(), the message be-
ing signed is a hashed digest of the message-to-be-signed rather than the
message-to-be-signed itself since the length of the message-to-be-signed varies.
If its length is larger than the length of the signing key (i.e., 256 bytes),
fos tpm sign() could not handle it. However, with the hashed digest, whose
length is fixed at 20 bytes, the input message to fos tpm sign() could never be
larger than the signing key. Another reason why SHA-1 is frequently used is
that it is a one-way function which is computationally infeasible to invert, and
is used to develop the Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC).
HMAC is an extension of SHA-1 that includes the shared secret between the
HMAC generator and the verifier. Then SHA-1 is applied to the concatenated
shared secret and message to generate HMAC. In TPM, HMAC is mainly used
to produce an authorization digest for the authorized or dual-authorized TPM
commands [TCG 2007] by including the antireplay nonce and the message-
to-be-authenticated. As the shared secret is not available to third parties an
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Fig. 6. The trustedFleck API for public key infrastructure and symmetric session key functions.
The public key cryptographic primitive interfaces allow applications to start up and turn off
onboard the TPM chip, to read the public key of the TPM chip, to encrypt or to decrypt a message, to
sign amessage, and to verify a signature. The symmetric key primitive interfaces allow applications
to encrypt and decrypt messages using the XTEA algorithm.
adversary cannot replay the intercepted message due to the antireplay nonce
or forge a valid HMAC for the tampered message to circumvent the HMAC
check.
In addition to the general security functions discussed above, trustedFleck
has some other configuration functions such as fos tpm saveState, which is to
preserve the nonvolatile area in each TPM duty cycle [TCG 2007]. This function
is important as it can ensure that the platform configuration information such
as PCR values can be preserved even after the TPM is turned off.
4.3.2 Asymmetric Key and Symmetric Key FOS Functions. This API is
summarized in Figure 6. Each TPM has a unique 2048-bit private key estab-
lished during manufacture which cannot be read. However, an application can
acquire the corresponding public key from the TPM which can be shared with
other nodes for encryption and signature verification purposes. An applica-
tion encrypts a message by providing the plain text, the length of the plain
text (which has to be less than or equal to the size of the public key), and a
public key—the cipher text is returned. Similarly, an application can decrypt
cipher text. The trustedFleck encryption and decryption facilitates message
confidentiality.
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Fig. 7. The trustedFleck API for trust functions.
trustedFleck provides two additional primitives, fos tpm sign() and
fos tpm verifySign(), for applications to sign messages or to verify the signa-
tures of messages. To generate a signature of a plain message, an application
produces the 20-byte HMAC value (also called digest) of the plain message by
using the fos tpm hmac() primitive. Then the application passes the digest to
the fos tpm sign(), which returns the signature of the plain message.
A base station typically has more computational power, memory, and energy
resources and can be treated as a certification authority (CA). All nodes store
the CA’s public key in their permanent memories such as electrically erasable
programmable read-only memory (EEPROM) before deployment, and the base
station has the public keys of all nodes. Multiple base stations and/or dedicated
CA nodes with more memory can be used to improve the scalability of this
approach. Therefore, message authenticity can be facilitated.
Previous work [Karlof et al. 2004] has shown that symmetric key cryptog-
raphy is tractable on mote-class hardware and can achieve message confi-
dentiality. Further, symmetric key cryptography is significantly less resource-
intensive than asymmetric key cryptography such as RSA. trustedFleck also
features a 128-bit symmetric block cipher based on the eXtended Tiny Encryp-
tion Algorithm (XTEA) [Needham andWheeler 1997]. XTEA operates on 64-bit
blocks with 32 or 64 rounds. trustedFleck chooses XTEA symmetric key cryp-
tography because of its small random access memory (RAM) footprint, which
makes it a good candidate for resource-impoverished sensor devices that typi-
cally have less than 10 kB RAM. XTEA can be used in an output feedback mode
to encrypt or decrypt variable-length strings.
4.3.3 Trust Functions. ThisAPI is summarized in Figure 7. trustedFleck is
able to attest to its state upon challenge from a remote device such as another
trustedFleck or the base station. Such behavior is called remote attestation.
Namely, a Fleck reports its integrity state, for example, the values inside its
PCR, to the remote trusted party (e.g., base station). By doing so, the attestor
can ensure that the attested trustedFleck is running the expected program,
and thus is trustworthy.
The trustedFleck primitive fos tmp pcrExtend() takes the secure hash func-
tion (SHA-1) of input values together with the current value in specified PCR,
and saves the returned hash value to the specified PCR.
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Table I. Comparison of RSA Encryption Times
Public Exponent Software Software Hardware
(e) 1024 bits 2048 bits 2048 bits
3 0.45 s 65 s N/A
65,537 4.185 s 450 s 0.055 s
Table II. RSA Computation Time in TrustedFleck for
e =65,537 and 2048 Bit Key
Encryption Decryption Sign Verification
55 ms 750 ms 787 ms 59 ms
The trustedFleck primitive fos tmp pcrRead() returns the hash value
stored in the specified PCR while fos tmp pcrQuote() could return one
or multiple PCR values. The difference between fos tmp pcrRead() and
fos tmp pcrQuote() is that fos tmp pcrRead() is a nonauthorized command
(i.e., no authentication is imposed on it); hence, fos tmp pcrRead() could be
used for local attestation but is not suitable for remote attestation. The trust-
edFleck primitive fos tmp pcrQuote() is an authorized command. The returned
PCR values cannot be tampered with without being detected as these values
are signed with the private part of a designated key pair stored in the TPM.
Each key pair stored in the TPM is assigned a shared secret when it is cre-
ated [TCG 2007] and this secret is utilized to produce an authorization digest
through HMAC, as described in Section 4.3.1.
The trustedFleck primitive fos tmp verifyPcrQuote() takes the output from
fos tmp pcrQuote() and verifies the respective signature.
5. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we discuss the performance of the trustedFleck platform in
terms of computation time, energy consumption, and financial cost.
5.1 Asymmetric Key (RSA) Operations
As part of our benchmarking we also implemented the RSA encryption algo-
rithm, on Fleck, in software for comparison. Table I shows the encryption time
for different key sizes and RSA public exponents (e) in both the software and
hardware implementations. The results show that the TPM chip can reduce the
computation time of RSA encryption by a factor of 8000, when e = 65,537 and
the key size is 2048 bits. Table I also shows that the software RSA implementa-
tion is thus impractical using embedded microcontrollers such as Atmega 128
when e > 3 and for key size larger than 1024 bits. A small e will make RSA
less secure, and a key size of 1024 bits will no longer be considered secure in a
few years time (see Section 3.1 for a detailed discussion).
We have not implemented the RSA decryption algorithm in software because
it is significantly more computationally intensive than the RSA encryption
algorithm (see Table II). Table II also shows RSA encryption, decryption, sign,
and signature verification computational times in trustedFleck.
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Table III. trustedFleck Current Consumption
Module Current (mA)
Fleck3 (without radio, node idle) 8.0
Fleck3 + Receive 18.4
Fleck3 + Transmit 36.8
Fleck3 + TPM encryption 50.4
Fleck3 + TPM decryption 60.8
Fleck3 + TPM signature 60.8
Fleck3 + TPM signature verification 50.4
Table IV. trustedFleck (RSA and XTEA) Encryption Energy Consumption for 1 bit of Data
Platform Current (mA) Time (μs) Energy (μJ)
RSA (software, e = 65,537, 2048-bit key) 8.0 219,730 7,030.0
RSA (hardware, e = 65,537, 2048-bit key) 50.4 27 5.4
XTEA (software, 128-bit key) 8.0 18 0.6
Table III shows the current consumption for different trustedFleck opera-
tions. It shows that RSA operations consume 37% to 65% more current than
transmitting in trustedFleck. Table IV shows the energy consumption of a
2048-bit RSA encryption operation when e = 65,537. It shows that the soft-
ware based approach consumes approximately 1300 times more energy than
trustedFleck for an RSA encryption operation. Table IV also shows that the
software based approach RSA encryption in WSNs consumes a large amount
(approximately 7 mJ/bit) of energy when e = 65,537 and the key size is 2048
bits. On the other hand, trustedFleck makes it feasible to support PKC tech-
nology in WSNs.
5.2 Symmetric Key (XTEA) Operations
We tested the performance of XTEA cryptography to determine its compu-
tational speed on the Fleck platform. trustedFleck can encrypt one block of
64-bit data in approximately 1.15 ms. Therefore, it takes approximately 18 μs
(Table IV, Row 3) to encrypt 1-bit data.
Table IV also shows that software symmetric key cryptography is indeed
significantly faster than hardware RSA asymmetric key cryptography (18 μs
vs. 27 μs per bit). Furthermore, XTEA encryption consumes approximately 10
times less energy compared to hardware RSA encryption, and approximately
12,000 times less energy compared to software RSA encryption. It suggests
that, in an energy-impoverished WSN, we should use symmetric cryptography
for most secure communications, and should use asymmetric cryptography in
critical tasks only (i.e., symmetric key management).
The effective data rate of Fleck transceiver (Nordic nRF905) is 50 kb/s
with Manchester encoding. For a 32-byte physical layer payload, there are
a 4-byte address and a 2-byte Cyclic Redundancy Check-16 (CRC-16) over-
heads. Therefore, the available bandwidth for the Media Access Layer (MAC)
is 50×32÷ (32+4+2) = 42.11 kb/s. It takes 23.75 μs for a NRF905 transceiver
to transmit 1 bit, which is significantly longer than the encryption time
(18 μs).
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Table V. trustedFleck PCR Operation Computational Time, Current and Energy
Consumption
Computational
Module Time (ms) Current (mA) Energy (mJ)
Fleck3 + TPM PCR read 5.8 52.8 0.918
Fleck3 + TPM PCR quote 1400 64 268.8
Fleck3 + TPM PCR verify quote 900 52 140.4
Fleck3 + TPM PCR extend See Figure 8 51.2 See Figure 8
Fig. 8. trustedFleck primitive fos tpm pcrExtend computation time and energy consumption ver-
sus the size of input program memory.
The other key advantage of XTEA is space efficiency. The FOS XTEA imple-
mentation has less than 100 lines of C codes, and requires 52 bytes of RAM
and 1082 bytes of program space only.
5.3 PCR Operations
We tested the performance of PCR operations to determine the computational
speed on the Fleck platform. Table V shows that it is very inexpensive (less
than 5.8 ms or 1 mJ in energy consumption) to read the value of a PCR.
However, the sign operation is significantly more expensive (see Table II)—it
takes approximately 1.4 s or costs 268 mJ in energy use for trustedFleck to
perform a fos tpm pcrQuote() operation.
Figure 8 shows the computational time and energy consumption of the
fos tpm pcrExtend() primitive against the size of the input program memory.
It shows that time and energy are approximately linear with memory size. For
a 10 kB program image, the energy consumption of the fos tpm pcrExtend()
primitive is approximately 847 mJ.
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Table VI. Energy Consumption of trustedFleck (2048 bits) and TinyECC
(192 bits)
Current (mA) Time (ms) Energy (mJ)
TinyECC 192k1 (sign) 8 3070 73.7
TinyECC 192k1 (verify) 8 3612 86.7
trustedFleck 2048 (sign) 60.8 787 143.5
trustedFleck 2048 (verify) 50.4 59 8.9
Table VII. Sign and Verify Operation Code Sizes
(bytes) of the trustedFleck (2048-bit) and TinyECC
(192-bit)
trustedFleck (2048) TinyECC (192k1)
ROM 1958 13,488
RAM 108 1712
5.4 TinyECC and trustedFleck
We study the performance of trustedFleck and TinyECC in this section. We
reuse the performance results of TinyECC (192k1, window size = 4) in the
MicaZ platform, which has a similar microcontroller (Atmega 128) as trust-
edFleck, as shown in Liu and Ning [2008]. Note that the security level of
a 2048-bit RSA is equivalent to that of a 224-bit ECC [Gurn et al. 2004];
therefore, a 2048-bit RSA is stronger than a 192-bit ECC.
Table VI shows the computation time and energy consumption of 192-bit
TinyECC and 2048-bit the trustedFleck sign and signature verification oper-
ations. The computation time of trustedFleck is significantly less than that
of TinyECC; for example, a sign operation of TinyECC is four times longer
than that of trustedFleck. Therefore, trustedFleck can reduce end-to-end sig-
nature generation and verification processes significantly. While trustedFleck
consumes approximately twice the energy of TinyECC for a sign operation,
it consumes approximately 12% energy that TinyECC requires for a signature
verification operation. Overall, trustedFleck consumes slightly less energy than
TinyECC for the sign and a signature verification operations combined. Since a
RSA 2048-bit is stronger than a ECC 192-bit, trustedFleck provides a stronger
security level than TinyECC with a similar energy consumption. Since a sign
operation in trustedFleck consume 15 times more energy than a signature ver-
ification operation, we can perhaps design security protocols that require more
sign operations in resource-rich nodes like the sinks [Watro et al. 2004].
Table VII shows the program flash (ROM) and RAM sizes of 192-bit TinyECC
and 2048-bit the trustedFleck sign and signature verification operations. It
shows that TinyECC uses seven times more space than trustedFleck in terms
of both ROM and RAM. Space efficiency is very important for resource-
impoverished embedded devices such as sensor nodes.
5.5 Node Lifetime Estimation
We assume that the node is powered by 2 AA 2800-mAHr batteries, which is
equivalent to 2800× 2× 1.5× 3,600 = 30,240,000 mJ. Then we can calculate
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Table VIII. Estimated Node Lifetime (in years) When a
10% Fraction of Battery Capacity is Available for the
trustedFleck Security Operations
Number of Operations Per Day
1 2 12 24
Sign 57.7 28.9 4.8 2.4
Verify 928.7 464.4 77.4 38.7
PCR quote 59.0 29.5 4.9 2.5
PCR quote verify 30.8 15.4 2.6 1.3
All 14.8 7.4 1.2 0.6
the expected lifetime of the node based on the energy consumption figure from
Tables II, III, and V when 10% of the battery capacity is available for security
operations. Table VIII shows these results. It also shows that the trustedFleck
operations are fairly affordable for a typical WSN node setting. For example,
if the node performs sign, verify, PCR quote, and PCR quote verify operations
twice per day, the expected node lifetime is 7.4 years.
5.6 The Financial Cost of the trustedFleck
AnAtmel AT97SC3203STPMchip costs $4.5when ordered in large quantities,6
which is less than 5% of the cost of popular wireless sensor nodes such as Telosb,
Iris mote, and Fleck (about $100). The TPM chip is small in size (Figure 1),
measuring just 6.1 × 9.7 mm, which is less than 2% of area of Fleck, and could
easily be integrated into a commercial manufacturing environment rather than
using the cumbersome expansion board used in this prototype.
6. CASE STUDIES AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we demonstrate the power of our trustedFleck primitives (see
Section 4.3) to easily and efficiently realize secure WSN applications. These
applications include, but are not limited to, secure over-the-air programming,
remote attestation, secure remote procedure calls (RPC), and secure session
key management. In addition to the variants of state-of-the-art key manage-
ment [Nilsson et al. 2008] and secure software update protocols [Hui and Culler
2004], we have also implemented a remote attestation protocol with the trust-
edFleck primitives, and show how the trustedFleck primitives can improve the
protocol’s performance.
6.1 Symmetric Session Key Encryption/Decryption
Symmetric key cryptography consumes significantly less energy than RSA
asymmetric key cryptography (see Table IV), and we envision that symmetric
session key cryptography will be used for most WSN secure communications,
and asymmetric cryptography will be used for limited critical tasks. For exam-
ple, asymmetric cryptography is used to exchange a new symmetric key daily
6http://www.atmel.com/dyn/products/view_detail.asp?ref=&FileName=embedded10_
18.html&Family_id=620.
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Fig. 9. Symmetric session key request operation with the trustedFleck primitives (underlined).
Node A requests a session key from a base station.
or hourly (also called the rekey process). We will discuss the rekey process in
detail in Section 6.2.
By utilizing just two trustedFleck primitives, we can easily achieve symmet-
ric key cryptography in trustedFleck (see Figure 6). fos xtea getkey() reads a
symmetric key from trustedFleck memory, and fos xtea encipher() encrypts
a plain message (msg), and returns an encrypted message (cipher). Therefore,
link-level secure transmissions can be achieved by passing the returned cipher
over the radio.
An application can choose to store the session keys in Fleck RAM, EEPROM,
or TPM EEPROM. When the keys are stored in Fleck RAM or EEPROM, the
key (getting and storing) operations consumes significantly less energy than
when the keys are stored in TPM EEPROM. However, storing the keys in Fleck
also exposes the keys to more risks. Hartung et al. [2005] demonstrated how to
extract the information in a node’s EEPROMand RAMwithin 1min. Perhaps it
is better to store the key in the TPM chip for those infrequent operations (e.g.,
sending one temperature sample to the base station every 5 min) and store
the key in the Fleck memory for high-throughput operations such as secure
over-the-air programming.
6.2 Sensor Node Symmetric Session Key Request/Assignment Operation
Figure 9 shows the protocol for a sensor node (Node A) to request a new sym-
metric key from a base station. Node A initiates this process periodically, for
example, hourly or daily. It generates a random number (Na, also called nonce)
and encrypts the nonce along with the Request (Req) command using Base’s
public key (PkBase) before transmitting it to the base. The purpose of nonce (Na)
is to defend against replay attacks. After receiving the Request message from
Node A, the base decrypts the message with its private key (SKBase). The base
then responds to the Req command by generating a new symmetric session key
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(KBA), and encrypts it together with Na using Node A’s public key (PkA) before
transmitting it to Node A. Node A decrypts the message from the Base with its
private key (SKA) and obtains the new symmetric key (KBA). Node A and the
base can then use KBA for future secure communications. Figure 9 also shows
the five trustedFleck primitives associated with each step of the key request
protocol.
The session key assignment operation is symmetric to the key request oper-
ations. The key assignment protocol is initiated, for example, in a group key
establishment event (see Section 6.3), by the base station instead of a node.
6.3 Group Key Establishment Operation
Group key establishment can be achieved by a combination of sensor node
symmetric session key request operations and sensor node symmetric session
key assignment operations. For example, if node A wants to communicate with
nodes B and C, Node A will request a new group session key from the base
station via the session key request operation introduced in Section 6.2. After
receiving the key request operation from Node A, the base station generates a
new symmetric key (Kabc). The base station assigns Kabc to Nodes B and C via
two session key assignment operations (see Section 6.2) before transmitting
Kabc to Node A. Then, Nodes A, B, and C begin secure communications using
the group session key Kabc.
6.4 Secure Software Update Protocol
Multihop over-the-air programming (MOAP) protocols such as Deluge [Hui
and Culler 2004] enable users to reprogram/retask the WSN remotely, which
is critical to efficient and effective management of large-scale long-duration
WSNs. The basic Deluge protocol works as follows. A node (Node A) advertises
its program version periodically. One of its neighbors (Node B) will send a
request to download a copy of the program from Node A if Node B’s version
is older than Node A’s. Node A begins the download process after receiving
the request. To support concurrent data disseminations and reduce network
reprograming time, Deluge divides a program into a number of pages.
By using the group key establishment operation introduced in Section 6.3,
trustedFleck can provide data confidentiality to Deluge. Furthermore, a base
station can achieve integrity and authentication by signing the advertisement
message and the program pages of Deluge with its private key (SKBase) be-
fore disseminating it to the network. After receiving a program page or an
advertisement message, a trustedFleck node can then verify the page or the
advertisement message with the public key of the base station (PkBase). This
mechanism ensures that wireless bootstrap can only be initiated by an autho-
rized host, that the code stream is private, and that a page is not committed to
flash unless it is from an authorized host.
A trustedFleck node can verify the signature of the a 256-byte page in 59 ms
(see Table II), which is more than 4,300 bytes/s. This trustedFleck signature
verification rate is approximately 50 times faster than the average 88.4-bytes/s
dissemination rate achieved by Deluge in a 75-node network [Hui and Culler
2004].
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6.5 Trusted Sensor Nodes
6.5.1 Adversary Model. We assume an adversary could have access to
a powerful computational resources such as a Notebook computers. He/she
could launch an external attack or an insider attack. In an external attack, an
adversary could eavesdrop on the information, inject malicious packets into the
network, replay previously intercepted packets, or impersonate other nodes.
Denial-of-service (DoS) such as jamming (i.e., an adversary keeps sending
garbage packets to cause collisions at theMAC layer) or power depletion attacks
(i.e., an adversary sends garbage packets to trigger TPM operations repeatedly
in its neighbors until the power of these neighbor nodes is depleted) is out of the
scope of this article. How to counter DOS attacks will be part of our future work.
The adversary could also compromise some nodes to attack the rest of the
nodes in the network [Francillon and Castelluccia 2008; Goodspeed 2007]. Such
an attack is called an insider attack because the compromised sensor nodes are
considered as legitimate nodes in the WSN before they are detected and re-
moved. The adversary could instruct the compromised nodes not to follow the
specifications of the security protocols (e.g., to selectively drop the packets)
or to exploit the vulnerabilities of the protocols. In this article, the adversary
could learn about the content stored in the memory areas of the sensor nodes
via node compromises. However, despite nodes being compromised, the cryp-
tographic information internally stored in the TPMs could not be learned7
because TPMs are tamper-proof hardware. For example, the private keys used
for signing messages or message decryption cannot be known to the attacker
even though the sensor nodes to which the TPMs are attached to have been
compromised.
6.5.2 Secure Bootloading and Remote Attestations. For the purpose of
secure bootloading, the Atmega 1281 processor is configured via the fuses
so that, on reset, control is transferred to the initialization code within the
bootloader segment. Then the initialization code performs a TPM clear state
(TPM ST CLEAR) reset, which clears all TPM configurations including PCR
values, followed by PCR extension (fos tpm pcrExtend()) for all 128 kB of the
program flash memory (including the bootloader segment). In addition, the
lock bit fuses are set so that the bootloader segment cannot be written from
software using the Scratch Pad Memory (SPM) instruction, and this confirms
our assumption that bootloader can be trusted.
The remote attestation protocol shown in Figure 10 is used to test the system
integrity of a node and to defend against over-the-airmalicious code injection at-
tacks as introduced in Francillon and Castelluccia [2008]. First, the challenger
sends out an attestation challenge to an attestator with a tuple (Pi, Na), where
Pi is a specified PCR index and Na is an antireplay nonce. If the challenger does
not hold the public key (Pka) of the attestator, it will request the public key from
a trusted third party such as a sink. Second, the attestator collects the signa-
ture S(Pi val, Na) using the trustedFleck primitive fos tpm pcrQuote() and its
7Such information is secured by Storage Root Keys (SRKs), which are directly created when the
ownerships of the TPMs are taken.
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Fig. 10. Remote attestation operation with the trustedFleck primitives (underlined). Node C
(Challenger) issues an integrity challenge to Node A (Attestator).
private key (SKa), where Pi val is the specified PCR value. Third, the attestator
sends the signature S(Pi val, Na) as the response of attestation challenge to the
challenger. Finally, the attestation can verify Pi val and its authenticity by using
the trustedFleck primitive fos tpm verifyPcrQuote(). If both Pi val and Na are
correctly verified, the challenge can then trust the attestator.
6.6 Backward Secrecy and Forward Secrecy
trustedFleck can enhance the security levels of the re-key process by providing
both backward and forward secrecy. Backward secrecy means that compromis-
ing the current symmetric link key does not allow an attacker to learn pre-
viously recorded messages encrypted with the previous key. Forward secrecy
means that compromising the symmetric link key does not allow an attacker
to learn future communication encrypted with the following key.
A symmetric link key can be found by an attacker by extracting it directly
from a captured node via a JTAG or similar device [Hartung et al. 2005] because
of the physically exposed and remote nature of nodes in WSN. Furthermore,
the attacker can also extract the initial random key used by the software
pseudorandom number generator. This key allows the attacker to compute all
past and future nonces used in the key updating protocol, which in turn allows
the attacker to compute all past and future keys.
Equipped with a FIPS 140-2 compliant true random number generator
(RNG), trustedFleck can increase the security level of the protocols. It is very
difficult, if not impossible, for an attacker, who has obtained the current sym-
metric link key, to find out the past or future keys generated by a true RNG.
6.7 Secure Remote Procedure Calls (RPC)
The Fleck Operating System (FOS) uses remote procedure calls (RPCs) to allow
application programs to seamlessly access services on one ormore sensor nodes.
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Table IX. Common Secure FOS RPC Actions
RPC Actions Description Cryptography
assign session key assign a new symmetric session key to a node PKC
request session key request a new symmetric session key from a base PKC
kernel get FOS system memory statistics share
read eeprom read from EEPROM share
read ram read from RAM share
threads get information about threads, label and stack usage share
write eeprom write to EEPROM share
write ram write to RAM share
rtc get get time from the real-time clock share
rtc set set the real-time clock share
txpwr set set radio transmit power share
leds set or toggle LEDs share
power get battery and solar cell status share
Each node-side service is described by an action file, a C-like function that
supports multiple input and output arguments. A code generator, in Python,
parses all action files and generates a server function and all the serializing
and deserializing code, as well as a Python class to be used by base station
applications. All nodes support the common set of actions listed in Table IX, in
addition to application-specific actions.
An RPC call message comprises the function arguments, function enumer-
ator, sequence number, and node ID of the caller, and a CRC-32. On receipt
of an RPC call message (indicated by the routing header type) the message
is decrypted using the session key and the CRC-32 checked. Except for the
assign session key and request session key RPC messages, all the other
RPC messages are encrypted using XTEA with the current session key (see
Section 6.1). assign session key and request session key RPC messages are
encrypted and signed with PKC as introduced in Section 6.2. In a sensor net-
work, it is possible to broadcast the RPC call encrypted by a group symmetric
key (see Section 6.3), and have the function executed in parallel on many nodes
which all return their results to the caller. In this case the result of an RPC
call would be a list of return values rather than just one.
Secure RPC, based on the trustedFleck primitives, provides privacy of com-
mands and return values, and authentication, and also immunity to replay
attacks.
7. CONCLUSION
We have shown that E-commerce-strength RSA-based security is feasible on
a sensor network device. We have utilized commodity TPM hardware tech-
nology to create a trusted node that provides essential security services such
as message integrity, confidentiality, authenticity, and system integrity based
on RSA public-key and XTEA-based symmetric-key cryptography. Our evalua-
tion shows that trustedFleck provides these services within the computational,
memory and energy limits that apply toWSN nodes. Our results also show that
trustedFleck significantly outperforms previous approaches such as TinyECC
in terms of computational time and memory usage while providing stronger se-
curity levels. Additional advantages of the hardware approach include secure
ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks, Vol. 7, No. 1, Article 5, Publication date: August 2010.
5:24 • W. Hu et al.
storage of the private key and support for system configuration checking. An
RSA-based security approach also allows for seamless and secure interoper-
ability between WSNs and Internet-based applications. We have shown with
examples of remote attestation, symmetric key management, secure RPC, and
secure software update, that the trustedFleck platform is easy to use.
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